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X. BLOCKADE
A. CONCEPT OF BLOCKADE
Whereas the law of contraband regulates the extent to w hich a belligeren t
can prevent an enemy from receiving goods useful in the conduct o{ w ar, the
law of blockade deals with the belligerent right-and lin1its thereto-to
prevent the vessels (and aircraft) of all states from entering and leaving
either the whole or a part of an enemy's coast. 1
In its origin, 2 blockade was conc~ived as a measure analogous to that of
siege in land warfare, and the attempt to bar the sea approaches to an
enemy port was considered legitimate only when carried out in conjunction
with military operations on land. Even when dissociated from siege by
land blockade remained a measure designed to reduce certain ports of an
enemy into submission through .. investment by sea." In the pursuit of
this objective a belligerent was considered as justified in prohibiting all
neutral intercourse with the besieged or blocked up port. However,
during the course of the nineteenth century the practice arose of using a
blockade principally to cut off an enemy's sea-borne trade, and thereby to
deprive him of the resources for waging war, rather than simply to force
1 Law of Naval Warfare, Article 632.a.-This, at least, represents the traditional concept of
blockade, though it must be added that in the light of recent developments-to be reviewed
shortly-blockade is now frequently considered to relate as well to the belligerent right to
prevent the cargoes of vessels and aircraft from reaching the blockaded area whatever the route
and method of conveyance. On the issues to which this extended concept of blockade gives
rise, see pp. 3ro-r2., 316-q.-In the following pages attention will be directed to the problem
of blockades by sea. The extension of blockades to include the air space over the high seas
remains a development for the future. It is next to impossible to declare with any degree
of assurance what procedures may govern blockade by air. Certainly, there are grave difficulties in assuming that the practices of naval blockade can be applied readily, by analogy,
to aerial blockades.
2 "In its origin,"' implying when once conceived as a distinct and separate measure of naval
warfare. Prior to such emergence it was, as Jessup and Deak point out, "closely tied up with
contraband. The common root from which both doctrines sprang is the total prohibition
of commerce with an enemy. This type of belligerent pretension was much in vogue from very
early times, still flourishing in the early seventeenth century, and has reappeared in various
guises at intervals ever since. In the face of neutral protests, and the growing strength of the
law of neutral rights in general, the belligerents receded from their insistence on total prohibi·
dons by two types of compromise or concession, one geographical and the other categorical;
geographically, the ban, instead of extending to the entire country of the enemy, was confined
to certain ports which were besieged or blocked up; categorically, the ban was limited to certain
categories of goods such as arms and munitions which came to be known as contraband of war."
The Origins (Vol. I~ Neutrality, Its History, Economics and Law, 1935), p. 104.
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hin1 to abandon further military resistance in a limited area. At the time,
opposition to the developing practice of so-called ' 'commercial'' blockades
was considerable, and even today it has not entirely disappeared. The
basis for opposition can be attributed largely to the conviction that in this
development the original purpose-and hence the justification-of blockade
had been abandoned; that from a military measure designed to pennit belligerents to conduct effective siege by sea, unimpeded by neutral efforts to
relieve an enemy made the object of attack> blockade had become a measure
whose significance was economic rather than military. As such it was
questioned, if only from the conviction that an enemy's economy could not
of itself form a legitimate military objective, particularly if this implied
striking at an opponent primarily through action immediately directed
against neutral trade. 3
Nevertheless, the attitude and practice of states during the half century
preceding World War I provided little support for this opinion. The 1856
Declaration of Paris had laid down the principle that blockades, in order to
be binding, must be effectively maintained, but beyond this had furnished
no indication that commercial blockades were forbidden. Nor did the
provisions of the 1909 Declaration of London, dealing with blockade,
contain any stipulation that could be interpreted as limiting this belligerent
measure to any well-defined purpose. If anything, the period under review
indicated acceptance of the notion that blockade could serve purposes
other than the narrowly construed military operation that had provided its
earlier justification.
Since 1914 the controversy over the legitimate purposes of a blockade
has lost its former significance. In both World Wars the belligerents considered the economy of an enemy not only a legitin1ate, but a principal,
military objective. "Economic warfare," in the words of the British
3 Thus John Westlake in an essay written during the period of the American Civil War,
declared that "commercial blockades ought to be abolished from motives both of justice and '
policy." The burden of the argument ran as follows: "A neutral cannot be touched by a
belligerent unless he has in some way identified himself with the enemy. Actual mixing in
the hostilities is such an identification, and to relieve a place which is the actual object of attack at the time, whether such attack be conducted only by sea, or by land also, is actually
to mix in the hostilities; therefore blockade in the case of siege is justifiable. To ship a cargo
to or from a country with which the shipper is at peace, that cargo being neither contraband
nor destined for the supply of a besieged place, is neither an actual mixing in the hostilities,
nor in any way an identification of the shipper with the enemy; therefore blockade except in
the case of siege is unjustifiable." The Collected Papers of John Westlake On Public International
Law, pp. 342.-3. Westlake quoted with approval the opinion expressed by the American
Secretary of State Cass, in r859, that the "blockade of a coast, or of commercial positions along
it, without any regard to ulterior military operations, and with- the real design of carrying
on a war against trade, and from its very nature against the trade of peaceful and friendly
powers, instead of a war against armed men, is a proceeding which is difficult to reconCile
with reason or with the opinions of modern times." Within four years the American Government was to declare one of the most important "commercial blockades" of the nineteenth
century.
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Ministry of Economic Warfare, ' 'is a military operation, comparable to
the operation of the three Services in that its object is the defeat of the
enemy, and complementary to them in that its function is to deprive the
enemy of the materialtneans of resistance.'' 4 In warfare at sea the pursuit
of this objective has led to a determined effort on the part of each belligerent to achieve the complete economic isolation of an opponent; to
prevent any imports to or exports from the territory of an enemy. Not
infrequently the term blockade has been used to indicate this belligerent
effort.
This use of the term blockade to comprehend the most varied of belligerent measures designed to cut off the whole of an enemy's sea-borne trade
undoubtedly has served to introduce an element of ambiguity. In part, socalled "measures of blockade" came to include those developments in the
law of contraband that have already received consideration. In part, however, they referred to actions whose justification was alleged to rest upon
the right of reprisal, and it is this latter category of measures that will form
one of the principal concerns of the present chapter. Admittedly, these
belligerent reprisal measures bear-at best-only a faint resemblance to the
blockades envisaged by the traditional law. Nor did they conform to the
customary rules governing blockade, though the degree to which the respective belligerents departed from the customary law varied considerably.
Nevertheless, it is abundantly clear that these measures of reprisal were intended, in almost every instance, to achieve the purpose of blockade as
presently conceived. At the same time, the frequency of belligerent
reprisal measures stands in marked contrast to the disuse into which
the traditional blockade, conducted in accordance with the customary
rules governing blockade, has fallen. 5
The explanation of this seemingly anomalous situation is as easy to discern as a satisfactory solution is difficult to reach. It is by now a commonplace that the customary rules regulating blockades have been found by
belligerents to be unduly restrictive-or, more accurately, almost impossible of application-under modern conditions. The customary law in force
at the outbreak of World War I was at once the product of, and designed
to regulate, "in-shore" or "close" blockades-i. e., blockades maintained
by a line of vessels stationed in the immediate vicinity of the blockaded
coast. But developments in the weapons of war have made the close
blockade a feasible operation today only in the most exceptional of circum4

Cited in Medlicott, op. cit., p. 17.
World War I several blockades were imposed which did conform to the customary
rules, but they were all of distinctly limited importance. These blockades, and the prize
decisions to which they gave rise, are reviewed by Garner, Prize Law During The World War,
pp. 62.1-30. During \Vorld War II the Russian declaration of a blockade of the Finnish coast,
proclaimed in January 1940, furnishes perhaps the only known instance of what was alleged
to be a blockade in the traditional sense. However, the Soviet Union denied being at war with
Finland, and the latter asserted that the alleged blockade was completely ineffective.
5 During
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stances. The difficulty, however, has not been that the customary law
forbade so-called "long-distance" blockades, as such, but that it required
the latter to conform to rules established for close blockades. And this
proved to be an impossible task.
To the foregoing must be added the further consideration that the very
intensity of the belligerent's desire to effect the complete economic isolation
of an enemy has been a factor of importance in preventing the adaptation
of the law governing blockade to changed conditions. For this intense
desire to cut off the whole of an enemy's sea-borne trade is itself one of the
changed conditions, along with the changes that have occurred in the
means for conducting naval hostilities; and it has meant that belligerents
have been more than content to rest their so-called "blockade" measures
upon the right of retaliation rather than to insist that this branch of the
law-as all others-cannot be frozen into a mold no longer suitable to
modern conditions No doubt it is true that neutral intransigence to change
has contributed to the belligerent decision to take retaliatory measures
rather than to argue on behalf of the legitimacy of altering the established
law. It is equally true, however, that belligerents have not been unwilling-on the whole-to avoid posing a clear and direct challenge to the
continued validity of the customary rules governing the operation of blockade, and this unwillingness may be attributed largely to the recognition
that reprisal measures provided the opportunity of pleading for greater
freedom of action than could reasonably be justified on any other ground&. 6

6 In a word, reprisal action furnished the pretext for belligerents to claim the right to do
what they wanted-which in both World Wars was nothing less than the complete stoppage of
enemy trade with the least possible commitment of surface naval forces-whereas the claim that
the customary rules were obsolescent under modern conditions probably would have led-at
best-only to modifications of the traditional law. This is apparent in the case of Germany,
whose methods of "blockading" Great Britain necessitated not only the abandonment of the
:'
rules heretofore governing blockade but, in addition, the abandonment of the most fundamental
rules applicable to any form of belligerent interference with neutral trade. On the other hand,
the case of Great Britain is more complex. It will presently be submitted that at least a very
large part of the British reprisals system in both World Wars may well be regarded as a reasonable adaptation of the customary law to changed conditions. At least this is considered true
with respect to the reprisal Orders in Council of March n, 1915 and November '-7, 1939 (see
pp. 305-6, 31'1-), and during World War I Great Britain herself so argued (see pp. 3o8-1o). On the
whole, however, Great Britain sought the method of reprisals and avoided contending for clear
legal change. Nor does it appear sufficient to explain this behavior by a fear that the British
Prize Court would have refused to justify action on any other grounds. Instead: Bdtish reluctance to seek the path of legal change may also be attributed to a desire to retain an undefinedand undefinable-freedom of action, a desire admirably served by the doctrine of reprisals. In ·
this connection, however, it has been observed that: "Both for political and for legal reasons
it is unfortunate that so important a part of British economic warfare should have so unstable
a foundation as the doctrine of retaliation. Politically it implies uncertainty, prior to. the
event, whether the regulations will be introduced." S. W. D. Rowson, "Modern Blockade:
Some Legal Aspects," B. Y. I. L., '-3 (1946), p. 351· But this "instability" has its virtues
(from the belligerents point of view), not the least of which is the retention of a "free hand."
This is true not only for future conflicts in which Great Britain may again find herself a bellig•
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The net result h as been a growing tension between the customary law
and belligerent practice. But to wh at extent recent belligerent practice,
though assuming the form of reprisals, may now be regarded as h aving
succeeded in replacing the tradi tiona! law assured! y remains an unsettled
issue. Before turning to this issue it will be useful both to restate in summary manner the customary law governing blockade and to review the
various recent measures taken by belligerents which served the purposes of
blockade, though departing from the rules traditionally governing its
form and operation.
B. THE CUSTOMARY RULES GOVERNING BLOCKADE
I.

Establishment and Notification.

The formal requirements of a blockade concern the manner by which it
must be established and its existe_nce made known. The authority to
establish a blockade rests solely with the belligerent government. For
this reason a declaration of blockade will generally be made direct by the
blockading state, though it may be made by the naval commander instituting the blockade, who thereby acts on behalf of his government. In
either case the necessity for a declaration containing the date a blockade
will begin, and its geographical limits, is clear. Equally settled is the
requirement that a belligerent must grant a certain period of grace to neutral
vessels in order that the latter may be able to leave ports included within
the blockaded area. 7
erent (and in a position approximately the same as in the two World Wars). It is equally true
for future conflicts in which Great Britain may occupy the position of a non-participant. In
the latter instance, the admittedly vague and controversial character of "reprisal" measures
bearing upon neutral rights at sea would leave Great Britain free to deny the legitimacy of
measures analogous to those she herself has resorted to in two wars.
7 Law of Naval Warfare, Article 632.b.-The length of the period of grace granted neutral
vessels to leave the blockaded area is dependent-in principle-upon the discretion of the state
establishing the blockade. The only clear requirement is that allowance must be made for such
departure.-Distinguish blockades as a regular measure of naval warfare between belligerents
from so-called "pacific blockades," as well as from the act of a parent state in closing its ports
during a period of insurrection or "insurgency." The legality of "pacific blockades" is very
doubtful today in view of the obligations imposed upon states Members of the United Nations.
In any event, "pacific blockades" are not belligerent measures, but actions directed by one
state against another with which it is at peace. While involving the ships of the state being
"blockaded," the vessels of third states cannot be interfered with. At least this has always
been the position taken by the United States. More disputed is the right of a parent government to close waters and ports to the vessels of third states when such waters and ports are
held by insurgent forces. Although the legal position here is far from clear, it does seem settled
that acts of closure cannot be made effective by measures which extend beyond territorial waters.
In the absence of a recognized condition of belligerency neither the parent government nor
insurgents can exercise belligerent rights against the vessels of third states on the high seas.
On the other hand, it is generally recognized that: "Within territorial waters both parties may
prevent supplies from reaching their opponent. This right of barring access gives no authority
to seize or destroy foreign ships." U. S. Naval War College, International Law Situations, IpJ8,
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Since knowledge of the existence of a blockade is deemed essential to the
offenses of breach and attempted breach of blockade, it is customary that
neutral governn1ents be notified by the blockading state of the establishment of a blockade and that the local authorities within the blockaded
area receive similar notification from the commander of the blockading
forces. 8 But although neutral vessels are certainly entitled to notification
of a blockade before they can be made prize for its attempted breach, it is
doubtful whether formal notification is required by law. Thus according
to Anglo-American practice the precise character such notification may
take is not considered material. 9
2. ~Jrectivcness

Once a blockade has been properly declared and its existence made known
it must satisfy three conditions in order to be considered binding: it must
be effectively maintained, it must not bar access to neutral ports and coasts,
and finally, it must be applied impartially. Each of these customary
requirements require further elaboration.
The obvious intent of the requirement of effectiveness is to prevent
belligerent resort to so-called ''paper'' blockades, that is, to the practice
of declaring blockades when the naval power available is utterly inadequate
to the task of enforcement. On the other hand, a blockade is effectively
maintained when all-or nearly all-of the vessels attempting to enter or
to depart from a blockaded area are prevented from so doing by the blockading force. Between these two situations doubt may well arise as to
whether in a concrete instance a blockade has succeeded in meeting the test
of effectiveness, and it would appear that the most satisfactory formula is
that the degree of effectiveness required must be such as to render ingress
to or egress from the blockaded area dangerous-hence seizure for breach
of blockade probable. 10
pp. 92.-3. An excellent review and analysis of this question is given in H. W. Briggs, The Law
of Nations (wd ed., 1953), pp. 100o-4. A recent example of the attempted closure of ports '
during a period of civil war occurred in June 1949, when the Chinese Nationalist Government
sought to close certain waters and ports held by the Communists. The incident is reviewed by
L. H. Woolsey, "Closure of Ports by the Chinese Nationalist Government," A.]. I. L., 44
(1950), pp. 35o-6.
8 Law of Naval Warfare, Article 632.c. Any change in the conditions of a blockade-e. g., an
extension of its geographical limits-will require fresh notification.
9 Notification may therefore be actual, as by a vessel of the blockading forces, or constructive,
as by proclamation, or by belligerent notice, or a matter of common notoriety.· However)
Articles I I and 16 of the Declaration of London accepted the practice of the continental European
states by requiring that a declaration of blockade be formally notified to neutral governments ,
as well as to the local authorities of the blockaded area. Given the present state of communications the matter of notification no longer constitutes the problem it once did (see pp. 2.92.-3).
10 Law of Naval Warfare, Article 632.d.
Uncertainty over the application of the rule regar~ing
effectiveness is of long standing. The 1856 Declaration of Paris, in laying down the requirement of effectiveness, defined an effective blockade as one "maintained by a force sufficient
really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.'' Article 2. of the Decbration of London
repeated this formula and added-in Article 3-that the question whether a blockade is effec-
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It is implicit in the customary rule of effectiveness, but should be given
special emphasis in view of more recent developments, 11 that the means a
belligerent may use in maintaining a blockade are not unlimited. More
specifically, the effectiveness required of valid blockades cannot be secured
by means violative of other firmly established rules. The element of danger
associated with an effective blockade is therefore to be understood in terms
of a liability to seizure and eventual condemnation, though not in terms
of a liability to destruction upon entrance into the forbidden area. 12 But
there is nothing in the traditional law preventing the use either of submarines or of aircraft in maintaining a naval blockade, so long as their
employment does not thereby result in a violation of the rules applicable
to surface vessels. 13
3 . Area of Blockade
It is a settled rule of the customary law governing blockade that a
blockading force must not bar access to neutral ports and coasts. 14 As
tive is a question of fact." The formula "sufficient really to prevent access to the enemy coast''
has never been regarded as very satisfactory, if for no other reason than that a literal interpretation might appear to require the prevention of any vessel from breaching a blockade-certainly
no requirement of law. Nor is the question whether or not a blockade is properly effective
merely a "question of fact." As Stone (op. cit., pp. 495-6) well points out: "The degree of
effectiveness reached in a particular case is a question of fact; but whether that degree satisfies
the legal standard is a question of law." Inevitably, this question of law is one in which a
substantial measure of discretion may be exercised, thus raising the possibility of controversy
between neutral and belligerent. The formulation contained in Article 632.d, Law of Naval
Warfare, follows the wording of previous instructions to the U.S. Navy, and is in accord with
the opinion expressed by the Supreme Court in the The Olinde Rodriquez (1899), 174 U. S. 510.
In this respect there is a close correspondence between the traditional American and British
views on the rule of effectiveness.
11 See pp. 2.96-305.
12 Unless, of course, the vessel attempting to breach blockade either persistently refuses to
stop upon being duly summoned by a surface warship or offers active resistance to visit and search.
13 In any event, at least one belligerent warship would be required to carry out the functions
of visit, search and seizure. Beyond this minimum the number of surface vessels will vary
according to circumstances, and one of these circumstances may be the degree of support a
surface force receives from submarines and aircraft, particularly the latter. The problems
arising from the use of mines as an instrument of blockade may be deferred for discussion in
relation to more recent developments (see pp. 303-5). Here it may be observed, however,
that it is very doubtful that the traditional law could be considered as having sanctioned the
use of mines, even as an auxiliary means for enforcing a blockade. See, for example, U. S. Naval
War College, International Law Topics, I90J, pp. 152.-3. Finally, it should be observed in passing
that the effectiveness of a naval blockade is not endangered by virtue of the fact that a belligerent does not render passage in the air over the blockaded area dangerous. At the same time,
it is true that a blockade ''maintained by surface vessels only without means of preventing or
rendering dangerous the passage of aircraft . . . would be a 'paper blockade' insofar as such
craft were concerned even though proclaimed to include these." U. S. Naval War College.
International Law Situations, I9JJ, p. 89.
14
Law of Naval Warfare, Article 632.c. Restrictions upon the belligerent extension of a block·
ade to certain rivers, straits and canals constitute the more detailed application of this general
principle. For a discussion of these restrictions, see Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op. cit., pp.
??I-s.
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applied to "close" or "in-shore" blockades the intent of the rule is to
prevent a belligerent from deploying a blockading force in such a manner
as to require vessels destined to neutral ports to pass through the line of
blockade, thereupon being seized and condemned for breach of blockade.
The extent to which the rule operated in the past to restrict belligerent
behavior depended largely upon the circumstances of geography. Normally, however, the danger of barring access to neutral territory was
reduced to a minimum in the case of close blockades. Conversely, it has
been generally contended-though the accuracy of this contention must
be closely examined-that the possibility of conforming to the rule in
question necessarily decreases the farther a blockading force is stationed
from an enemy coast.
Even prior to World War I the military feasibility of a close blockade
was seriously questioned. As already noted, the traditional law did not
require close blockade~ and opposition to the "long distance" blockade
maintained by Great Britain during the first World War merely for the
reason that the blockading force was stationed at a considerable distance
from the enemy's coast was scarcely decisive. Indeed, as a neutral the
United States had conceded in the early stages of that conflict that '• the
form of' close' blockade with its cotdon of ships in the immediate offing
of the blockaded ports is no longer practicable in the face of an enemy
possessing the means and opportunity to make an effective defense by the
use of submarines, mines and aircraft . . . " 15 Nor was it disputed that
the necessities imposed by geography might even render imperative that a
blockading cordon be drawn across the sea approaches common to both
neutral and enemy ports. But if that contingency arose, it was declared
that a blockading belligerent would nevertheless remain obliged ''to
comply vvith the well-recognized and reasonable prohibition of international law against the blockading of neutral ports, by according free
admission and exit to all lawful traffic with neutral ports through the ,
blockading cordon. This traffic would, of course, include all outwardbound traffic from the neutral country and all inward-bound traffic to the
neutral country except contraband in transit to the enemy. 16
What clearly emerges from the above statement is the contention that
whatever the ultimate destination or origin of goods carried by a neutral
vessel, seizure of the latter for breach of blockade (though not, .of course,
for carriage of contraband) is justified only if the vessel itself is bound to or
15

The statements quoted in the text above form a part of the correspondence between the ,
United States and Great Britain, and were occasioned by the Briti~h Order in Council of March
II, 19r5. For a further discussion of this correspondence, together with references, see pp.
308-ro.
16 To which was added the further observation that: "Such procedure need not conflict in
any respect with the rights of the belligerent maintaining the blockade since the right would
remain with the blockading vessels to visit and search all ships either on entering or leaving
the neutral territory which they were in fact, but not of right, investing."
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from a blockaded port. 17 There can be little question that, in principle,
this position formed an accurate statement of the customary law as it stood
at the outbreak of war in I9I44· Appliration of Blockade
The third substantive principle governing the operation of a blockade is
that it must be applied impartially to the vessels of all states-including
the vessels of the blockading belligerent. 18 The purpose of this rule is to
prevent a blockading belligerent from taking advantage of his position
in order to discriminate in the treatment accorded to different countries.
Thus a belligerent would violate the principle of impartiality if he allowed
the vessels of certain states to pass through the blockaded area while
excluding the vessels of other states. However, impartiality in the treatment of the vessels of all states refers only to the standard of behavior
demanded of the blockading belligerent within the area that is being
blockaded. More precisely, the rule applies only with respect to the
vessels of all states attempting either to enter or to depart from the blockaded ports or coast by sea.l 9 There is no requirement that a blockade
must bear with equal severity upon the trade of neutral states. It may be
that despite the blockade some neutrals will be able to continue to trade
with blockaded ports by means of inland waterways. It may also be that
by choosing to blockade only some of the ports of an enemy, while leaving
others open, a blockade will bear more heavily upon the trade of one
neutral than of another. In either case the neutral whose trade suffers as
a result will have no ground for complaining that the blockading belligerent has failed to conform to the principle of impartiality.
Nor is the obligation of impartiality violated if the commander of a
blockading force allows neutral warships to enter and subsequently to
depart from a blockaded port. But it is within the discretion of the commander of the blockading force to decide whether or not he will permit
such entrance and departure, and under what conditions permission will
be granted. 2° Finally, merchant vessels in evident distress may be permitted to enter and subsequently to leave a blockaded port. 21 Whether
such permission may be detnanded as a matter of right is unsettled though.
17

Though it should be made clear that by 1914 there was ample authority for seizing a vessel
immediately bound for a neutral port if it could be clearly established that after touching at the
neutral port the vessel intended to go on to a blockaded port. (See pp. 2.93-5).
18 Law of Naval Warfat·e, Article 632.f. Article s of the Declaration of London stated that:
"A blockade must be applied impartially to the ships of all nations."
19 And it should be added that impartiality is quite compatible with a blockade that merely
forbids the ingress of vessels or, conversely, the egress. There is no requirement that a belligerent
forbid both ingress to and egress from the blockaded area. He may choose the one, or the
other, or-as will generally be the case-both. Whatever his choice the blockade once established must then be applied impartially.
20 Law of Naval Warfare, Article 632.h (r).
21 Law of Naval Warfare, Article 632.h (2.).
399334-57--20
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In any event, a vessel accorded the privilege of entry and departure must
neither receive nor discharge any cargo in the blockaded port. 22
5. Termination of Blockade
A blockade may be terminated, or raised, at any time by declaration of
the blockading state, or by the commander of the blockading forces acting
on behalf of his government. It is customary on such occasions for the
blockading state to notify all neutral governments. Apart from formal
notice neutral states may regard a blockade as raised once it is no longer
maintained with the minimum degree of effectiveness required by law.
For reasons already pointed out, the question as to when a blockade is no
longer effective can hardly be regarded as self-evident~ and on this question
the opinion of neutral states may therefore meet with resistance on the part
of a belligerent that has sought to establish-and claims to have established-an effective blockade. At the very least, however, it is clear that
if a blockading force is driven off by an enemy the blockade has come to
an end. Still further, in the event a blockading force leaves the area for
reasons unconnected with the blockade the latter must be regarded as
suspended. 23
6. Breach of Blockade
It has already been observed that knowledge of the existence of a blockade forms an essential condition for the offenses of breach and attempted
breach of blockade. At one time this requirement gave rise to a marked
diversity in state practice, since the slowness of communications frequently
made it difficult to determine whether or not a vessel (i. e., the owner or
master) had the requisite knowledge. Today, however, the problem has
lost much of its former importance~ due to the rapidity with which a
blockade's existence may be made known. There is at present general
agreement that knowledge may be presumed in all instances where a vessel
has sailed from the port of a neutral state whose government has already
22 Article 7 of the Declaration of London provided that: •'In circumstances of distress, acknowledged by an authority of the blockading forces, a neutral vessel may enter a place under blockade and subsequently leave it, provided that she has neither discharged nor shipped any cargo
there." And as Higgins and Colombos (op. cit., p. 546) observe: "In every case, the exemption
based on distress must be one of uncontrollable necessity, which admits of no compromise,
and cannot be resisted.''
23 Article 30 of the 1941 U. S. Navy Instructions declared that: ••If the blockading vessels be
driven away by stress of weather and return thereafter without delay to their station? the continuity of the blockade is not thereby broken. The blockade ceases to be effective if the blockading vessels are driven away by the enemy or if they voluntarily leave their stations, except
for a reason connected with the blockade; as, for instance, the chase of a blockade runner."
The factor of weather is no longer likely to play any role in the task of maintaining a blockaqe.
More important, the entire problem of determining when a blockade has ceased to be effective
can no longer be regarded merely by reference to the conditions characterizing close blockad~s.
The .. stations" for future blockading forces are likely to cover vast areas of the high seas, and
it will prove as difficult to determine when vessels have ••left their stations" as it will be to
judge when they have been .. driven away" by an enemy.
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received notification of the blockade. And even in the absence of such
fortnal notification a presumption of knowledge will arise-at least according to American and British practice-if the existence of the blockade is
nevertheless considered to be a mat ter of common notoriety. 24
Breach of blockade therefore occurs-according to the customary lawwhen a vessel knowing, or presumed to know, of a blockade passes through
the forbidden area. In addition, according to the traditional view of the
United States and Great Britain the liability to seizure of a blockade runner
extended throughout the dura don of her voyage. .Hence if a vessel sailed
from her home port with the clear intent to evade the-blockade, liability
to seizure (for attempted breach of blockade) began from the time the
vessel first appeared on the open seas. Conversely, if a vessel once succeeded in breaking out of a blockaded port, liability to seizure continued
until completion of the voyage. 25
On the other hand, the position taken by a number of European states 26
24 With respect to breach of blockade by ingress Article 15 of the Declaration of London
provided that: "Failing proof to the contrary, knowledge of the blockade is presumed if the
vessel left a neutral port subsequently to the notification of the blockade made in sufficient
time to the Power to which such port belongs." Article 16 went on to state that if a vessel
did not know or could not be presumed to know of the blockade ''notification must be made
to the vessel itself by an officer of one of the ships of the blockading force." In effect, these
provisions narrowed considerably the differences formerly existing between Anglo-American
and continental practices, since notice by direct warning was restricted-by Article 16-to
relatively infrequent cases.
With respect to breach of blockade by egress Article 16 went on to declare that: "A neutral
vessel which leaves a blockaded port must be allowed to pass free if, through the negligence
of the officer commanding the blockading force, no declaration has been notified to the local
authorities, or, if, in the declaration, as notified, no delay has been indicated." But this provision was at variance with American and British practice, which always presumed knowledge
on the part of vessels within blockaded ports.
25 Thus paragraph 31 of the U. S. Navy's 1917 Instructions declared that the liability of a
blockade runner to capture and condemnation "begins and terminates with her voyage. If
there is good evidence that she sailed with intent to evade the blockade, she is liable to capture
from the moment she appears upon the high seas. If a vessel has succeeded in escaping from
a blockaded port, she is liable to capture at any time before she completes her voyage. But
with the termination of the voyage the offense ends." Article 44 of the U.S. Naval War Code,
1900, made a substantially similar provision. The traditional British position has been summarized as follows: "Liability to capture, according to British practice, in the case of a ship
which breaks out continues from the time of sailing until the whole voyage is completed, and
is not discarded by touching at some intermediate port on the way to the final destination.
Similarly in the case of breaking in the liability commences from the moment the vessel sails
with the formed intention of breaking the blockade, and continues until the blockade has been
raised or the intention has been clearly and voluntarily abandoned. But this change of intention must be complete. A ship is not permitted to proceed to a neighboring port with a view
to making inquiries as to the chances of running in from there, and with the intention of taking
those chances if they appear reasonable but abandoning the intention if force of circumstances
and the vigilance of the blockading squadron make it inadvisable to persist. A ship must have
a clear and innocent programme from the outset." J. A. Hall, Law of Naval Warfare, pp. 2.05-6.
26 E. g., France, Italy, Germany and the Netherlands.
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had been to insist that a vessel could be seized for blockade running only
within the immediate area of operation of the blockading forces. Furthermore, liability to seizure followed-in this view-only from overt action
on the part of a vessel to break through the lines of blockade. 27 In the
1909 Declaration of London the attempt was made to resolve these divergent views. 28 Accordingly, that instrument provided that the seizure of
neutral vessels for violation of blockade could be undertaken "only within
the radius of action of the ships of war assigned to maintain an effective
blockade.'' 29 A further provision laid down that ''whatever rna y be the
ulterior destination of the vessel or of her cargo the evidence of violation
of blockade is not sufficiently conclusive to authorize the seizure of the
vessel if she is at the time bound toward an unblockaded port.'' 30
It must be etnphasized that in blockade it is the destination of the vessel-not of the cargo-that forms the decisive consideration. At least this
was true prior to I 914. However, the Anglo-American view had been that
liability for blockade running could not be avoided simply for the reason
that a vessel intended to touch at an intermediate neutral port prior to
making for a blockaded port. To this very limited extent the doctrine of
continuous voyage may be said to have been applicable to the offense of
attempting to break blockade, and for this reason Article 19 of the Declaration of London may not be regarded as providing an accurate statement
of the position heretofore taken by the United States and Great Britain.
But in providing that a vessel was not liable to seizure if encountered bound
for a neutral port, simply because the cargo carried on board was ultimately
27 The one exception being that seizure was considered permissible outside this area in the
case of a blockade runner actively pursued by a vessel of the blockading forces.
28 It is true that in practice these differences were not as great as might otherwise appear,
and Higgins and Colombos (op. cit., p. 552.) point out that "there is no case in actual practice
in which a vessel has been condemned for breach of blockade except when she was found actually close to or directly approaching the blockaded port." Nevertheless, there are a number
of instances in which courts did give careful attention to the ultimate destination of vessels
encountered some distance from the blockading forces, and even purportedly bound for neutral
ports. Besides, this practice refers to close blockades. It is clear that in a long-distance
blockade-considered as such-the standards regarding evidence of intention that were formerly
applied to close blockades would necessarily present easy opportunity for evasion. Nor is it
reasonable to expect belligerents to adhere to these former standards in operating long-distance
blockades. In this respect belligerent practice in the two World Wars is likely to provide
more accurate guidance for the future (see pp. 308-15).
29 Article 17. This provision was viewed at the time as a compromise between the AngloAmerican and the continental view, the term "area of operations" (rayon d'action) being regarded
as a formula whose elasticity was sufficiently great to provide reasonable adaptation to the
developing weapons of naval warfare. In reality, though, Article 17 left the old dispute very
nearly where it found it, since the continental powers urged that the "area of operations" be
rather strictly confined whereas the British and American delegations pressed for the right of
the blockading belligerent to fix the radius of action, depending upon the circumstances governing each case.
30 Article 19.
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destined for the blockaded area, Article 19 did give expression to the
consensus of the major naval powers. It is true that during the American
Civil War there were several cases that could possibly be interpreted as
extending liability to seizure for blockade breach to vessels sailing for
neutral ports, with no ulterior destination, though carrying cargoes ultimately destined to pass through the blockade. But whatever the interpretation given these cases it is reasonably clear that prior to World War I
they had not been considered either by the United States or by Great
Britain-and certainly not by any other maritime powers-as having come
to represent a part of the established law governing liability for breach of
blockade. 31
7· Penalty for Breach of Blockade
The penalty for breach-or attempted breach-of blockade is the confiscation of the vessel and cargo. As an exception, if the owners of (noncontraband) cargo can establish ignorance either of the existence of a
blockade at the time they put their goods on board the blockade runner or
of the intention of the vessel to violate the blockade such goods will not
be condemned. 32
Nearly all of the Civil War cases were ambiguous in this respect since they also involved
the carriage of contraband, and seizure (as well as condemnation) could have followed on this
ground alone. It is Hyde's opinion (op. cit., p. 2.2.12.) that "attentive examination of certain
important American cases oftentimes regarded by the commentators as indicating an unfortunate
invocation of the doctrine of continuous voyage to establish breach of blockade, reveals the
fact that there were in almost every instance other grounds for decision. Hence numerous
dicta in relation to blockade running lack the significance frequently attached to them.'' It
should be added that these cases involved instances where either the ultimate destination of
both vessel and cargo was the blockaded area or where the cargo alone was destined to pass
through the lines of blockade (being carried on a different vessel). In the case of cargo destined for the blockaded area by a route other than by way of the forbidden passage there was a
clear refusal to consider liability for breach of blockade as arising.
It is believed to be of some importance to emphasize the position held by the United States
prior to 1914 with respect to the application of the doctrine of continuous voyage to blockade.
In retrospect, a number of writers have ventured to attribute to this earlier position a character
that would appear altogether unwarranted. Apart from a small number of rather obscure
and controversial Civil War decisions, there is no indication that in the period prior to World
War I the United States had ever endorsed the application of the principle of continuous voyage
to blockade, save in the very restricted sense already referred to in the text. There is a considerable difference, however, between applying the principle of continuous voyage to a vessel
and applying the same principle to cargo carried by a vessel. Whereas the former application had
been clearly endorsed by this country the latter had not. Nor did any change occur in this
respect in either the 1917 or the 1941 Instructions. But see Law of Naval Warfare, Article 632.g (3),
for a limited change from the earlier position in the light of belligerent practice during the two
World Wars. And see pp. 305-17 for a discussion of recent belligerent practice and the problems to which this practice has given rise.
32
Either possibility is highly unlikely. Besides, the exception does not apply to goods
owned by those who also own the vessel, since in the latter instance the master of the vessel
is considered to be the agent of the shipowners.
31
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C. BELLIGERENT "BLOCKADE" MEASURES IN THE TWO
WORLD WARS
Claims to Restrict Neutral Navigation Tbrough the Estahlishment of
Special Zones
The effective maintenance of a lawful blockade of any magnitude necessarily requires an appreciable commitment of surface naval forces. 33 Recent
experience has indicated, however, that if belligerents are determined to
isolate an enemy the temptation will prove strong to achieve the purposes
of a blockade though without conforming to the established principles
regulating this form of belligerent interference with neutral commerce.
Since 1914 one of the principal devices for accomplishing the purposes of a
blockade has been the establishment of special areas or zones, variously
described, 34 within which belligerents have claimed the right either to
restrict neutral freedom of navigation or to forbid such navigation altogether.
At the very least, the belligerent in proclaiming these special zoneswhich frequently covered vast tracts of the high seas-has assumed the
competence to render the waters included therein dangerous to neutral
shipping through the laying of mines. Neutral vessels have been warned
I.

This remains true even though the use of aircraft as an auxiliary arm of blockade may
reduce considerably the need for surface vessels to patrol large areas-as in the case of blockades
maintained at great distances from an enemy's coasts. For the necessity to effect lawful seizure
of blockade runners remains.
34 The varied terminology used in reference to the1>e areas (e. g., "operational zones," "war
zones," "barred areas," "military areas," "areas dangerous to shipping") forms a possible
source of confusion. On the one hand, different terms have frequently been used to refer to
areas in which substantially similar measures were employed. (E. g., the German distinction
between kriegsgebiet and sperrgebiet, the former indicating a "military area" or "war zone" in
which the use of arms is to be expected at any time and the latter signifying a "barred" or ,
"forbidden" zone in which every merchant ship-enemy or neutral-may expect to be treated
as an enemy warship. But from the point of view of the actual measures taken against neutral
vessels the differentiation between kriegsgebiet and sperrgebiet (or seesperre) appears only to have
resulted in a distinction without a difference). On the other hand, the same term has occasionally been used in reference to areas in which quite different measures were taken by belligerents. It remains true, however, that despite differences in the specific measures taken by
belligerents within these zones the common intent has been to limit neutral freedom of navigation through the resort to methods that avoid the commitment of surface forc~s otherwise
required in maintaining a lawful blockade (or, for that matter, in maintaining a system of contraband control conforming to the traditional law). This decisive point is clearly recognized
by Stone (op. cit., p. 572.), who writes: "While its (i.e., "barred" or "war" zones) uses may
vary, its function is essentially to reduce the belligerents required commitment of surface ves_sels
in naval operations of economic warfare, whether defensive or offensive, and whether covering
ports or coast line, or hundreds of miles therefrom. Such economies have been made pos~ible
by the invention of new methods and weapons such as submarines, contact mi~es, magnetic
and acoustic mines, and radio-telegraphy. By such means, great areas of the high seas may be
rendered so dangerous for navigation that they do not need surface patrols."
33
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that if entering these areas the belligerent could not insure their safety-or
accept responsibility in the event of their destruction by mines-unless the
vessels folowed prescribed routes and submitted to certain further controls
laid down by the belligerent. 35 The more extreme measures taken by
belligerents sought to prohibit the entrance of neutral vessels into barred
zones by threatening to deprive entering vessels of all safeguards normally
accorded peaceful shipping. Thus the German war zone declarations of
January 31, 1917 and August 17, 1940 stated that neutral vessels persisting
in entering forbidden areas would thereby become liable to destruction at
sight by submarines and aircraft. 36
35 Thus on November 3, 1914, Great Britain declared that the whole of the North Sea would
thereafter be considered a "military area." The declaration went on to state that within this
area "merchant shipping of all kinds, traders of all countries, fishing craft, and all other vessels,
will be exposed to the gravest dangers from mines which it has been necessary to lay and from
warships searching vigilantly by night and day for suspicious craft." U. S. Naval War College,
International Law Documents, I94J, p. 52.. The action was taken as a defensive "counter measure"
against what was alleged to be the German policy of using merchant vessels (flying neutral
flags) to lay mines indiscriminately on the high seas, and particularly along the ordinary trade
routes, in violation of the provisions of Hague Convention VII (1907). In declaring the "military area" instructions were given to neutral vessels, intending to trade with Northern European
and Dutch ports, to follow certain prescribed routes. Provided this was done, and other minor
controls were adhered to, Great Britain accepted responsibility for insuring the safety of neutral
traffic. One of the immediate effects of the measure was to bring neutral shipping using this
area under the close scrutiny of the British contraband controls. The United States refrained
from joining other neutrals in entering a strong protest against the measure, and upon entering
the hostilities itself cooperated-in 1918-with the British in laying a mine field extending
across the North Sea. See E. Turlington, op. cit., pp. 36-48.
On the outbreak of war in September 1939, the British Government notified neutrals that
mines were being laid in restricted areas off the British coast as well as in specified regions off
the German coast. In December 1939, the Admiralty gave notice of its intention to lay extensive minefields in the North Sea off the east coast of England and Scotland. In April 1940, it
was announced that minefields had been, or would be, laid in the North Sea from the proximity
of the Dutch coast to the Norwegian coast, in the Skaggerak (except for a twenty mile wide
channel), in the whole of the Kattegat, and in the Southern Baltic. Later, still further minefields were declared. Once again, Great Britain accepted the responsibility of providing for
the safety of legitimate neutral shipping passing through some (though not all) of these mine
fields. Neutral vessels found inside the areas were subject to removal by British warships and,
if found making use of communication facilities contrary to zoning orders, even to seizure for
unneutral service. Nor did Great Britain appear to have attempted to justify these measures
as acts of a retaliatory character.
36 The German declaration of February 4, 1915, in which the waters surrounding Great
Britain and Ireland were proclaimed a "theatre of war," was not expressly intended-at least
not on paper-to interdict neutral vessels. Instead, it was stated that enemy merchant vessels
would be sunk without warning and neutral ships would navigate at their peril" . . . for even
though the German naval forces have instructions to avoid violence to neutral ships in so far
as they are recognizable, in view of the misuse of neutral flags ordered by the British Government and the contingencies of naval warfare their becoming victims of torpedoes directed
against enemy ships cannot always be avoided . . . . " U. S. Naval War College, International
Law Docttments, I94J, p. 53· On the other hand, the declaration of January 31, 1917 broadened
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It need hardly be pointed out that these belligerent measures cannot be
regarded as conforming to the customary requirements laid down for lawful
blockades. Even if completely effective in preventing all neutral traffic
with an enemy, and this possibility can no longer be excluded, 37 the methods
that have characterized war zone operations would not warrant serious
consideration in this respect, for the degree of effective danger that is to
attend the attempt to break blockade must be a lawful danger. There is
no basis for the belief that the requirement of effectiveness, demanded of
lawful blockades, can be met simply by using any means in order to render
dangerous the passage of neutral vessels through areas of the high seas
declared to be "blockaded." 38
The foregoing considerations admittedly are not conclusive in judging
whether the belligerent establishment of war zones may be regarded as
legitimate methods of warfare at sea. The fact that they cannot be regarded as forming lawful measures of blockade does not prevent their
possible justification on quite different grounds. In a sense it may even
prove somewhat misleading to deal with these special zones in connection
with the general problem of blockade) and the only reason for doing soas already noted-is that they have been largely intended to accomplish
the same purposes as blockade. Even so, the central question remains:
Have belligerents any right either to restrict or to exclude altogether
considerably this earlier area (now termed a "war zone," and even a "blockade area") and
extended the unrestricted submarine warfare to neutral vessels as well. In both declarations
the measures were described as retaliatory, and a response to the allegedly unlawful behavior
of the Allies.
In World War II the German Government announced, on August 17, 1940, a "total blockade"
of Great Britain. Alleging that England had acted increasingly in violation of the rules regulating belligerent behavior at sea, thus justifying German retaliatory measures, the announcement concluded:
"Germany, having repeatedly warned these [neutral] States not to send their ships into the
waters around the British Isles, has now again requested, in a note, these governments to
forbid their ships from entering the Anglo-German war zones. It is in the interest of these
States themselves to accede to this German request as soon as possible.
The Reich Government wishes to emphasize the following fact: The naval war in the waters
around the British Isles is in full progress.
The whole area has been mined.
German planes attack every vessel. Any neutral ship which in the future enters 'these waters
is liable to be destroyed." U.S. Naval War College, International Law Documents, I940·, pp. 46-50.
37 Developments in submarines and aircraft alone make this possibility a very real one today.
38 It is primarily for this reason that it has always been doubtful whether a belligerent is ·
permitted to use mines as a supplementary means for enforcing an otherwise lawful blockade
(and not so much for the reason, generally advanced, that Article 2. of Hague VII forbids the
laying of automatic contact mines "off the coasts and ports of the enemy, with the sole object
of interrupting commercial shipping''). By establishing a blockade a belligerent is not thereby
granted the special license to subject neutral vessels and aircraft to grave hazards that are
otherwise forbidden by law (seep. 2.89).
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neutral vessels 39 from navigating within certain areas of the high seas by
rendering these areas dangerous to shipping? 40 In addition, what is the
extent of this belligerent right-assuming such right to exist-and the
obligations that accompany its exercise?
It is reasonably well established, to begin with, that a belligerent is permitted to place restrictions upon, and even to forbid altogether, neutral
n~vigation in two quite distinct-and limited-areas. In the first, the
practice of states has sanctioned belligerent efforts. to acquire a greater
measure of security through according belligerents the right to exercise
control over neutral vessels within a restricted area of the high seas adjacent
39 It should be pointed out that in considering the legal issues raised by the belligerent establishment of war zones most writers have emphasized only the effect of such zones on neutralthough not enemy-merchant vessels, despite the fact that the zones have operated equally
against both. Thus Stone (op. cit., p. 572.) writes that as "between the belligerents inter se
this belligerent assertion of extended control raises no problems." In still another treatise it
is observed that: "As between the belligerents only, provided that the war zone is enforced
by the use of means, whether submarine contact mines, or surface or submarine craft, which
comply with the laws of maritime warfare, both customary and conventional, there can be no
doubt of the lawfulness of the practice." Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. 682.. In reality,
these statements, and particularly the latter, would appear an evasion of the issue. Insofar
as operational zones "comply with the laws of maritime warfare" they are quite superfluous,
at least if by this the traditional law is understood. Save as a measure of reprisal against an
enemy, the mere fact that a belligerent has declared a war zone does not serve to confer upon
him greater discretion in the measures taken against enemy merchant vessels. On the other
hand, if it is assumed that as between belligerents the declaration of war zones "raises no
problems," this can be so only for the reason that by such declaration the powers of a belligerent
with respect to enemy merchant vessels are not substantially increased. This assumption,
implying as it does a belligerent license to destroy enemy merchant vessels without first removing passengers and crew to a place of safety, cannot yet be accepted. But it is quite true
that given the circumstances in which warfare at sea is now carried on (see pp. 6710), as between
belligerents the declaration of special zones in which merchant vessels are not accorded the
immunities demanded by the traditional law may add very little to the measures a belligerent
may in any event take against enemy shipping. And it is for this reason that the legal issues
raised by war zones have related primarily to neutral shipping. However, should belligerents
refrain in future hostilities from integrating their merchant vessels into the military effort at _
sea there would be no justification for the policy of destruction on sight. Nor, for that matter,
would a belligerent be justified in introducing such a policy through the device of proclaiming
war zones.
40 To what extent the issues involved in the declaration of war zones at sea apply to aerial
zones above the high seas-barred to neutral civil aircraft-is difficult to say. There would
appear to be no difficulty in accepting the position taken by Spaight (op. cit., pp. 400-1), that
belligerents may forbid neutral aircraft from entering zones where military operations are in
progress (a point that will be discussed shortly). But this claim is clearly a modest one,
being limited to the immediate area of operations (naval or aerial). The real question, however, is not whether belligerent license in the air is as great as at sea, but whether it is greaterin view of the formative character of the law of aerial warfare. Nevertheless, it must be
admitted that it is impossible to state with any real precision the present limits of the controls
permitted to belligerents over neutral aircraft in the airspace above the high seas (and see pp.
354-6).
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to territorial waters. 41 Within these waters belligerents may lay mine
fields and take other measures designed to insure the defense of co as tal
regions. It does not appear possible at the present time, however, to state
with any degree of precision either the extent these areas may take or the
intensity of the controls that may be exercised within them. It does seem
fairly clear that the general criteria to be used in judging the legitimacy
of a particular defensive area must be the reasonableness of its extent, in
terms of its essentially defensive function, as well as the ability of the belligerent to exercise a close and effective control over the area. But beyond
this little more can be said.
Altogether different, yet equally well established in practice, is the right
of a belligerent to control the movements of neutral vessels and aircraft
within the immediate area of naval operations. If necessary, a belligerent
commander can order such vessels and aircraft to depart from these areas.
H allowed to remain within the vicinity where forces are operating they
must obey such orders as are given to them (e. g., with respect to the use
of radio), and any failure to do so-or to depart from the area when so
ordered-will render offending vessels and aircraft liable to being fired
upon or captured. 42 Nor can vessels complain if, -while remaining within
the near vicinity of belligerent operations, they are made subject to the
incidental hazards invariably attending the conduct of such operations.
It should be emphasized, though, that the immediate area of naval
operations refers to an area within which naval hostilities are taking place
or within which belligerent forces are actually operating. As such it
41 See pp. 2.2.4-6 for a discussion of similar measures undertaken by neutrals. In large measure,
the considerations introduced in this previous discussion are equally applicable to belligerents.
Apparently, the first instance of "defensive sea areas" proclaimed by a belligerent occurred
during the Russo-Japanese War, when Japan proclaimed that within certain coastal zones
neutral shipping would be subject to special restrictions. U.S. Naval War College, l1zternational
Law Topics, zg12, p. 12.2.. In both World Wars the United States, as a belligerent, established '
several "defensive sea areas" and "maritime control areas," which included territorial waters
as well as a very limited area beyond these waters.
42 Law of Naval Warfare, Articles 43ob and 52.oa. Recognition of the right of belligerents
to control the activities of neutral vessels and aircraft within the immediate vicinity of naval
operations may be found in the naval manuals of a number of states. In Article 7 of the unratified Rules for the Control of Radio in Time of War, which formed Part I of the 1923 Rules
drafted by the Commission of Jurists at the Hague, a belligerent commanding officer, considering
the success of his operation to be prejudiced by the presence of vessels or aircraft equipped with
radio installation, was authorized to order such vessels and aircraft to depart from the area orif remaining-not to make use of their radio apparatus while within the vicinity of belligerent
forces. Failure to conform with the orders given was held to result in liability to capture or
to the risk of being fired upon. Finally, Article 30 of the 192.3 Rules of Aerial Warfare declared
that: "In case a belligerent commanding officer considers that the presence of aircraft is likely
to prejudice the success of the operations in which he is engaged at the moment, he may prohibit
the passing of neutral aircraft in the immediate vicinity of his forces or may oblige them to
follow a particular route. A neutral aircraft which does not conform to such directions . . .
may be fired upon.''
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must be clearly distinguished from those special areas or zones of indefinite
extent not made the scene of naval hostilities and entrance into w hich is
forbidden to neutral vessels for substantial periods of time. The claim to
control neutral vessels and aircraft within the immediate vicinity of operating forces is essentially a limited and transient one and is based not only
upon the right of a belligerent to insure the security of his forces but upon
the right to attack and to defend himself without interference from neutrals. 43
Neither of the preceding examples represent serious restrictions upon
neutral freedom of navigation on the high seas. Both types of areas are
related to belligerent requirements of a narrowly defensive character, and
the controls belligerents may exercise within them are generally recognized
as outweighing the limited inconvenience caused to neutrals. However,
in the belligerent establishment of war zones there may be found a seriousand perhaps even a fatal-blow to the traditional law. This threat arises
only in part from the fact that, in principle, war zones have had no clearly
discernible limits, whether in their geographical extent or in their duration.
Equally important is the central purpose they are designed to serve, which
is to a void committing large surface forces to the task of cutting off an
enemy's sea borne commerce through adherence to methods sanctioned by
the traditional law.
Nor rna y it be of more than limited relevance that the measures taken by
belligerents in the establishment of war zones were based, at least in the
1914 war, almost entirely upon the right to retaliate against the allegedly
unlawful behavior of an opponent. Even during the second World War
belligerents retained in a number of instances the form of reprisals when
establishing war zones, thereby acknowledging that the measures contemplated against neutral shipping were in normal circumstances without
justification in law. Yet by the close of the 1939 war the persistent and
widespread resort to war zones had undeniably served to raise the question
whether the act of establishing such zones was any longer in need of the
plea of reprisals, 44 a plea that had admittedly taken on a rather perfunctory
43

It is only to be expected that belligerents will attempt-and have attempted-to assimilate
the two types of areas into one category, the purpose being to justify war zones by an appeal
to grounds properly reserved for immediate areas of naval operations. Occasionally, writers
also fail to make the distinction emphasized above, with the result that the essential differences
between these two areas are obscured.
44 During the inter-war period a number of German writers had already concluded that the
belligerent establishment of barred zones stood in no need of the special justification of reprisals.
Instead, it was contended that neutral vessels must suffer the consequences (i. e., destruction)
if they persist upon entering areas declared as forbidden or barred by the belligerent. The
belligerent is obligated-from this point of view-only to make known to neutrals the exact
position of the barred zone; having once proclaimed the extent of the zone and the measures
to be taken therein against neutral vessels he is relieved of further responsibility (e. g., E.
Schmitz, "Sperrgebiete im Seekrieg," Zeitschrift fur auslandisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht, 8 (1938), pp. 641-71. And for a more recent-and seemingly sympathetic-view by a
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charac ter and that on occasion was sin1ply omitted altogether. And even

if the latter question 1nust still be answered affirmatively, the consideration
remains that for all practical purposes there may be little difference between
permitting war zones to be established only as retaliatory measures and
according belligerents the competence to resort to these measures as a
matter of legal righ t, quite apat·t from reprisal. In either event the consequences for neutral commerce may be very nearly the same, particularly if
the resort to reprisals becomes-as it has become in recent naval hostilitiesa permanent feature of warfare at sea.
Nevertheless, while a legal analysis cannot be unmindful of current-and
persistent-realities it cannot make so easy an identification of legal right
with belligerent practices Not only have the more extreme of these
practices failed to receive the acquiescence of a majority of states, they
have been made the object of general condemnation even when resorted to
under the guise of reprisals Thus, it is at least clear that the measures
Germany sought to take w ithin w ar zones-against neutral vessels-have
not received approval, whatever the justification urged on their behalf. 45
Swiss writer, see H. E. Duttwyler, Der Seekrieg und die Wirtschaftspolitik des Neutralm Staates
(1945) , pp. 38-41). The novelty of this theory must be found in the contention that the principal requirement for almost any belligerent measure against neutral shipping-regardless of
t he degree to which such measure may depart from established law-is prior notice on the
part of the belligerent. It need hardly be pointed out, however, that no legality attaches to a
belligerent measure merely for the reason that neutrals have been given prior warning. Nor is
there any merit in the equally novel argument that the effectiveness of the belligerent measures
t aken within barred zones provides a basis for asserting the lawful character of such measures.Not infrequently, however, these arguments have been further obscured by identifying "barred
zones" with what are in reality "immediate areas of operations," the apparent intent being
to justify the attack upon neutral vessels that have allegedly interfered with "belligerent
operations ." The wholly unwarranted basis for this latter identification has been noted in
the preceding discussion.
45 As already noted, the essential feature of this practice has been the claim that the declara- '
tion of war zones provides a sufficient justification-particularly when taken as a reprisal-for
barring all neutral shipping from a defined area, and for making neutral vessels entering the
area after notification liable to destruction at sight by submarines or aircraft. In considering
this practice the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg declared:
" . . . the proclamation of operational zones and the sinking of neutral merchant vessels
which enter these zones presents a different question. This practice was employed in the war
of 1914-18 by Germany and adopted in retaliation by Great Britain. The Washington Conference of 19'-'-, the London Naval Agreement of 1930, and the protocol of 1936 were entered
into with full knowledge that such zones had been employed in the first World War. Yet the
protocol made no exception for operational zones. The order of Doenitz to sink neutral ships
without warning when found within these zones was, therefore, in the opinion of the Tribunal,
a violation of the protocol." For text of judgment, U. S. Naval War College, International Law
Documents, I946-47, p. 300.
Although the Tribunal did not expressly so state, the implication is reasonably clear" that
the sinking of neutral vessels within operational zones was not justified even as a measure of
reprisal. Nevertheless, the Tribunal did not pronounce sentence on the accused (Admiral
Doenitz) for his breaches of the international law governing the conduct of submarine warfare,
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This same broad consensus appears lacking in the evaluation of belligerent
claims to establish barred areas of indefinite extent on the open seas through
the laying of mine fields. Indeed, the severe condemnation of war zones
from which neutral shipping is barred under threat of destruction from submarines and aircraft has not infrequently been accompanied by the acquiescence to zones from which neutral shipping is barred by means almost
equally destructive. In large measure, the source of this extraordinary position may be attributed to a convention-Hague Convention VIII (1907)that has been described, and not inaccurately, as worthless. 46 Although
the avowed purpose of Hague Convention VIII is to provide for the security
of" peaceful shipping," the effect of that instrument has been to invite the
abandonment by belligerents of any substantial restraints upon the use of
mines. According to a literal reading of Article 2. a belligerent has only to
proclaim that his "sole" intention is not to intercept peaceful shipping in
order to lay automatic contact mines off the ports and coasts of an enemy.
In addition, Article 3 allows the implication that, within the terms of the
Convention, belligerents may sew anchored automatic contact mines anywhere upon the high seas. Nor is a belligerent even placed under a strict
obligation to notify third states of the precise location and extent of mine
fields once laid. Instead, the obligation is only "to notify the danger
zones as soon as military exigencies permit." Hence the interpretation is
allowed that it is only mine laying of an openly indiscriminate character
that is prohibited-i.e., mines sewn without regard to any definite military
operation save that of endangering all peaceful shipping, and without any
reasonable assurance of control or surveillance. 47 The experience of World
Wars I and II has shown that no appreciable amount of ingenuity is required
"'in view of all the facts proved and in particular of an order of the British Admiralty announced
on May 8, 1940, according to which aJl vessels should be sunk at sight in the Skaggerak, and
the answers to interrogatories by Admiral Nimitz stating that unrestricted submarine warfare
was carried on in the Pacific Ocean by the United States from the first day that Nation entered
the war. . . . " It may be of some relevance to observe that the unrestricted warfare carried
on in the Pacific Ocean by the United States was directed against Japanese merchant vessels,
though not against neutral shipping (which was, by this time, almost non-existent). The
British order in the Skaggerak, though certainly affecting neutral shipping, was given during
the period following upon the German invasion of Norway. At that time the Skaggerak came
very close to resembling an "immediate area of naval operations." For these reasons, it is
difficult to see how the "'facts" cited by the Tribunal could be considered as offsetting the
measures taken by Germany within operational zones against neutral shipping.
46 "As an instrument of control," H. A. Smith (op. cit., p. 95) writes of Hague VIII, "the
convention is quite worthless and does not merit detailed examination.'' In fact, it is somewhat
worse than worthless in that it has provided belligerents with arguments that would otherwise
find no justification. A useful review of the problem, as seen from the viewpoint of the customary law, is given in U. S. Naval War College, International Law Topics, I9I4, pp. roo-38.
47
See Law of Naval Warfare, Article 6n, for the text of Hague VIII. According to Article 1
of the Convention the laying of unanchored automatic contact mines is forbidden except when
~o constructed as to become harmless one hour after the person laying them ceases to control
them.
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of a belligerent to reconcile almost any use of mines with the requirements
laid down in these provisions. 48
It may be suggested, however, that the provisions of Hague Convention
VIII need not-and, indeed, should not-be considered as exhausting the
scope of a belligerent's obligations. The general principle that the burden
of proving the legitimacy of any particular iorm of interference with neutral
vessels rests squarely upon the belligerent asserting it is as applicable-in
the case of war zones-to the use of mines 49 as it is to the use of submarines. 50 There is no apparent reason for considering the one instrument
less hazardous to neutral merchant vessels than the other. Nor is it easy
to see why the destruction of neutral vessels through mines is somehow less
violative of the rule forbidding the sinking of such vessels before first removing passengers and crew to a place of safety than is the same act of de- ,
struction when performed by submarines. Finally, if the mere act of declaring that within a certain area neutral vessels will thereafter be destroyed
by submarines cannot serve to render such destruction lawful, how can a ,
similar declaration notifying the extent of a minefield-entrance into which
is accompanied by the risk of destruction-make the latter measure lawful?
In either case neutral vessels may be confronted with the alternatives of '
avoiding the barred areas or entering it at the risk of destruction. 51
4BThus in the initial stages of the 1939 war Great Britain charged that Germany-as in 1914had violated the provisions of Hague VIII by the indiscriminate laying of mines along the paths
of the principal trade routes, by failure to notify peaceful shipping of the precise extent of the
minefi.elds, and by laying mines off the English coasts for the sole purpose of interrupting
neutral shipping. Germany denied these charges, asserting that the notification of minefields depended upon military considerations which Germany alone could judge and that the
purpose of laying minefields off the English coasts was not for the' 'sole purpose of intercepting
commercial shipping." See Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VI, pp. so~n..
49 A principle that appears equally applicable to the belligerent use of magnetic and acoustic
mines (whether laid by surface vessels or aircraft), even though Hague VIII refers only to auto~
marie contact mines.
50 And this is particularly so when such belligerent claims to restrict neutral commerce as '
war zones represent are carried out by methods violative of other established rules of law.
51 The above considerations may appear-when once they have been made-as almost selfevident. Yet it is surprising how frequently they have been neglected by writers who look
upon the submarine with critical eyes, though viewing the use of mines with what approaches
equanimity. And it is for this reason that some writers-particularly German publicistshave suggested that the belligerent measure of proclaiming barred areas, in ·which neutral
vessels thereafter entering incur the risk of attack from submarine, does not essentially differ
from the establishment of minefields from which neutral vessels are also barred. In considering
the latter argument, Stone (op. cit., p. 574) observes that: "Retaliation apart, the belligerent
case may rest on the argument that neutrals cannot complain of- the laying of individual mines
of a lawful type, at particular places on the high seas, and that a 'barred zone' is after all merely
a systematic disposition over a wide area of mines lawfully sown at each point within it .. This
argument on principle would, however, still afford no legal warrant for attaching an·y legal '
liabilities, such as liability to be sunk at sea, to the neutral's trespass into that zone." But this
is surely an obscure position. A barred zone may be as much "enforced" by mines as by submarines, and in both instances there is an attempt to attach a "legal liability" in the event of
forbidden entrance.
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In brief, it is difficul t to avoid the conclusion that there is no greater
legitimacy attached to the use of mines as a means for establishing war
zones on the high seas than there is in the use of other means (e. g., submarines) in order to realize the same purpose. Still further, it does not
appear possible to assert that-apart from reprisal-belligerents have at
present the right to restrict the movement of neutral vessels within vast
tracts of the open seas merely by proclaiming that these areas have been
rendered dangerous-in one form or another-to neutral shipping. Hence,
despite bellgerent practices in two wars the establishment of war zones
forms a lawful measure only when taken in response to the persistent misconduct of an enemy. 52 Even then, belligerents have not yet been conceded
the right to bar altogether such areas to the use of innocent neutral traffic. 53
Instead, the right to restrict the freedom of movement of neutral vessels
implies the belligerent obligation to. indicate certain routes by which
neutral traffic may pass through the declared war zones with a reasonable
assurance of safety. 54
2..

The Allied ''Blockades'' of Germany

Although the practice of interdicting neutral intercourse with an enemy
through the establishment of special areas or zones was not confined to
any one belligerent it is properly associated-particularly in its more
extreme manifestations-primarily with the German conduct of warfare
at sea. Very different in character were the measures upon which Great
Britain and her allies relied in both World Wars for effecting the economic
isolation of Germany. 55
What is frequently referred to as the British" long-distance blockade" of
Germany in World War I rested largely upon two Orders in Council that
were expressly justified as measures of retaliation. In the first of these
orders, issued March II, 1915, the declared intent was to prevent goods of
52

Particularly enemy misconduct equally affecting belligerent and neutral rights at sea, but
which neutral states are either unwilling or unable to prevent (see pp. 253-8).
53 It was this feature-i. e., the attempt at total prohibition-that succeeded in arousing
as much of the opposition to German was zones as the fact that these zones were partially
enforced through the threat of destruction from submarines. On the other hand, the British
war zone declarations were generally not total prohibitions, but the assertion of a right to
control the movement of neutral traffic subject to the designation of lanes through which the
mine fields could be passed in safety. The importance of this difference in the practice of the
two states ought not to be underestimated.
54 However, in reference to the British barred zones of World War II it has been stated that:
''These developments tended in the direction of a successful assertion of the right of the belligerent to lay mine-fields on the high seas irrespective of reprisals but subject to the duty to
insure the relative safety of neutral uaffic." Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. 683n (z).
In practice, the difference between this opinion and the opinion expressed in the text above is
not likely to prove very great.
55 Very different in character not merely for the reason that they were much more effective
than the German war zone declarations in cutting off neutral commerce, but for the far more
important reason that they were applied without unlawfully endangering neutral lives.
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any kind from reaching or leaving Germany .56 According to its terms no
1nerchant vessel was to be permitted to proceed to or from Germany carrying
goods destined to or laden in the ports of the enemy. Intercepted vessels ·
were subject to compulsory deviation to a British or Allied port and required to discharge cargo having an enemy origin or destination. In
addition, 1ncrchant vessels t hough proceeding to or from neutral ports
could nevertheless be intercepted and required to discharge such goods as
were found to be of enemy origin, ownership, or destination. The disposition finally made of goods discharged in British or Allied ports varied,
but in all instances not involving contraband (which, of course, was in any
event liable to condemnation) it fell short of confiscation. Nor was any
penalty attached to a vessel in respect to the carriage of goods foundeither upon calling voluntarily at an Allied port or upon being intercepted
and escorted in to port-to be non-contraband in character. However, the
severity of this earlier measure was increased by a later Order in Council of
February 16, 1917, which, in addition to providing for the capture and condemnation of any vessel carrying goods with an enemy destination or of
enemy origin, declared that any vessel "encountered at sea on her way to
or from a port in any neutral country affording means of ~ccess to the enemy
territory without calling at a port in British or Allied territory shall, until
the contrary is established, be deemed to be carrying goods with an enemy
destination, or of enemy origin, and shall be brought in for examination,
and, if necessary, for adjudication before the Prize Court." 57 This presumption, which if not displaced resulted in condemnation of both vessel
and cargo, could be avoided only by calling for examination at an appointed
port. Even then, cargo found to be of enemy origin or destination was
liable to condemnation.
As retaliatory measures taken in response to Germany's unlawful conduct
of submarine warfare these tvvo Orders need never have raised controversial
questions relating to the scope of the belligerent right of blockade. Of
course, the measures could be-and were-challenged by neutrals on the
ground that reprisals taken by one belligerent against an enemy, for the
alleged misconduct of the latter, could not be used as a basis for encroaching
upon otherwise recognized neutral rights. In the absence of a lawful
blockade it :was therefore held that neutral vessels carrying non-contraband
cargo-whether neutral or enemy owned-must be considered exetnpt from
belligerent interference. Apart from the question of reprisals; the latter
56 The German decree of February 4, 1915, proclaiming the !Vaters around Great Britain a
war zone in which enemy merchant vessels would be sunk without warning and neutral·vessels
.
would enter only at grave peril, provided the basis for this retaliatory order.
5 7 Cited In Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. 137-8.
The justification given for the order of '
February 16, 1917 was declared to be the German war zone declaration of January 31, 1917,
extending the area of previous war zones and applying measures of unrestricted submarine
warfare to neutral vessels found within the prohibited zone.
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contention was certainly supported by the traditionallaw.58 But this admission cannot be considered as necessarily relevant in determining the
legality of belligerent measures which-though departing from normal
rules regulating the actions permitted against neutral commerce-are taken
in response to enemy misconduct directed agains t both belligerent and
neutral, and which neutral states are either unwilling or unable to prevent.
Despite the admitted hazards and possible abuse implicit in these measures
it has been earlier submitted that, in principle, their. legitimacy may be
upheld. 5 9
On the other hand, it is a different question to ask w hether the specific
measures taken by Great Britain and her allies '\v ere justified by reason of
the circumstances in which they were invoked and in view of the attendant
hardships they imposed upon neutrals. The fact that before the British
Prize Court the retaliatory measures taken during World War I were considered to be legitimate acts of reprisals, 60 and not imposing unreasonable
hardships upon rLeutrals, cannot of itself be regarded as conclusively
establishing the legality of the measures under international law. In
general, the status of retaliatory measures bearing adversely upon the
normally recognized rights of neutrals is necessarily one of uncertainty. 61
liB To this extent the reprisal measures went beyond the established law in the following
respects. First, by ordering the detention-and finally the condemnation-of all goods having
an enemy destination, even though not confiscable as contraband. In practice, the benefits
received from this extension of belligerent right were not appreciable, considering the extent
of belligerent contraband lists. Second, by ordering the detention-and finally the corrdemnation-of all goods having an enemy origin. Apart from reprisal, there was no other warrant
for such action, since the seizure of goods carried on neutral vessels and bearing an enemy origin
was justified only in case of blockade. Third, the condem...'1ation of vessels-under the Order
of February 16, 1917-for carrying goods of enemy destination or origin also went beyond the
existing law, which provided for condemnation-in the absence of blockade-only in certain
cases involving c2.rriage of contraband (see pp. 2.76-7). Fourth, in laying down-again under
the Order of February 16, 1917-that a vessel bound to or from a neutral port providing means
of access to an enemy would be presumed to be carrying goods of enemy destination or origin
if failing to call at a British or Allied port for inspection of the cargo. The effect of this
presumption, even though rebuttable, was to permit the seizure of vessels merely for the failure
to call at a British or Allied port, and to place the burden of establishing innocence of the cargo
upon the neutral claimant. On the other hand, the compulsory diversion of neutral vessels to
British or Allied ports for inspection of the cargo-allowed under the Order of March II,
1915-may be considered independently from these issues (see pp. 338-44).
69 See PP· 2.56-8.
60 As a means of reprisal, the legitimacy of the Order in Council of ~/larch II, 1915 was upheld
in The Stigstad [1916], 5 Lloyds Prize Cases, p. 361; the Order of February 16, 1917 in The Leonora
and Other Vessels [1919], 7 Lloyds Prize Cases, pp. 357-63.
61 This is particularly so when the facts that are alleged to provide the basis for reprisal orders
are themselves a matter of grave uncertainty. (And it should be noted once again that before
the British Prize Court these facts are not made the subject of inquiry, the Court contenting
itself to accept the statement of facts given by the Executive.) During World War I reprisal
orders were based upon enemy acts that were, in turn, claimed to be retaliatory measures. Who
initiated the endless series of reprisals by first resorting to unlawful behavior even now forms
the subject of considerable controversy.
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Probably for this reason Great Britain, though rejecting the neutral claim
of immunity from the effects of belligerent "reprisal orders, .. was not
unwilling to contend that in its operation at least the retaliatory system
thus established did not depart from the essential principles demanded of
a lawful blockade.
On this basis 62 the principal objections made by the United States
against the British ·'long-distance blockade' • were three in number. 63 The
Order of March II, I9IS was enforced largely by the presence of a British
cruiser squadron in the North Atlantic, operating some Iooo miles from
German ports. From this vantage point the British \varships ':vere in a
position not only to intercept vessels bound to and frotn German ports by
way of the principal Atlantic trade routes, but also to intercept vessels
bound to and from northern European neutral ports that provided access
to Germany. At the same time, trade between these neutral ports and
Germany-being ''inside'' the '' blockade''-remained open. In seizing
vessels carrying goods suspected of having an ultimate enemy destination
or origin, though bound at the time to or from a neutral port, it was contended that the so-called "blockade" 1neasures thereby violated the principle requiring that blockades not bar access to neutral ports. 64 Still
further, it was noted that since the measures in question did not have the
effect of intercepting trade carried on directly between Scandinavian and
German Baltic ports they did not bear with equal severity upon all neutrals
and therefore lacked an impartial character. Finally, and in close connection with the preceding point, it was observed that in failing to close
off trade between German and Scandinavian ports the" blockade" measures
did not satisfy the requirement of effectiveness.
In reply to these objections the British Government asserted that while
the measures taken ought not to be judged by strict reference to the letter
of the rules applicable to blockade, they were in substantial conformity
with the spirit of these rules and should be regarded as a reasonable adap:
I. e., on the basis of whether the retaliatory measures in question conformed to the essential
principles governing lawful blockade. Needless to say, there could be no question of the
fulfillment of the formal requirements of blockade (declaration or notification).
63 The immediate and following paragraphs consist of a brief summary of the American notes
of March 30, 1915 and October 2.r, 1915, as well as the British notes of July 2.3, 1915 and April
2.4, 1916. Convenient texts may be found in A.]. I. L., 9 (1915), Spec. Supp., pp. u7, 157 and
10 (1916) Spec. Supp., pp. 72., 134.-This controversy, it should be clearly understood, dealt
only with the earlier order of March II, 1915, and the measures taken by Great Britain to carry
it out. By the time of the second-and more stringent-Grder in Council of February 16, 1917
the United States was on the verge of becoming a participant in the conflict, and with its
entrance into hostilities the mainstay of neutral resistance collapsed. Similarly, in World·
War II the British repri'\al order of July 30, 1940 came at a time when neutral resistance, though
still appreciable, had begun to diminish in strength. These facts should be kept in mind when
considering the possible significance of the British retaliatory systems on future developments.
64 Though no objection was made either to the long distances maintaiped between the
"blockading" force and German ports or to the fact thar the cruiser cordon was drawn across
the sea approaches to neutral ports (seep. 2.9o).
62
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tation of the latter to the peculiar circumstances in which the "blockade"
of Germany had to be conducted. The charge that neutral ports were
being blockaded was therefore denied by the contention that a belligerent
did not violate any "fundamental principle of international law by applying
a blockade in such a way as to cut off the enemy's commerce with foreign
countries through neutral ports if the circumstances render such an application of the principles of blockade the only means of making it effective."
It was claimed that every effort was being made to distinguish between
cargo consigned to neutral ports with a genuine neutral destination and
goods ultimately destined to an ene1ny. 65 As against· the charge that the
"blockade" measures were partial in their application it was observed
that "the passage of commerce to a blockaded area across a land frontier
or across an inland sea has never been held to interfere with the effectiveness
of the blockade. If the right to intercept commerce on its way to or from
a belligerent country, even though it may enter that country through a
neutral port, be granted, it is difficult to see why the interposition of a few
miles of sea as well should make any difference. If the doctrine of continuous voyage may rightly be applied to goods going to Germany through
Rotterdam, on what ground can it be contended that it is not equally
applicable to goods with a similar destination passing through some
Swedish port and across the Baltic or even through neutral waters only?'' 66
65 To which the further argument was added that "we have tempered the severity with which
our measures might press upon neutrals by not applying the rule which was invariable in the
old form of blockade that ships and goods on their way to or from the blockaded area are liable
to condemnation." This was quite true-at least until the Order of February r6, 1917-but
could only serve to justify the measures in question as a legitimate reprisal (since not bearing
too harshly upon neutrals), not as a legitimate blockade conducted in conformity with the
customary law governing this belligerent measure. For that law, as earlier observed, permitted the seizure of vessels (and cargoes) only if the latter were found to be destined to a
blockaded port-whether directly or after touching at an intermediate neutral port. The claim
that vessels could be seized for blockade breach on the grounds that the cargo carried was ultimately destined to the blockaded area-the essence of the British position-simply could not
be regarded as sanctioned by the customary law of blockade. Nor was this claim strengthened
by the consider?tion that goods, upon reaching a neutral port, might be transshipped to another
vessel and then pass through the forbidden area, since the decisive consideration was the
ultimate destination of the vessel, not the cargo. That circumstances, as Great Britain pointed
out, justified the extension of the concept of destination applicable in blockade to cargoes as
well might be true (and, indeed, this position is subscribed to in the following pages). Nevertheless, this quite different consideration ought not to obscure the fact that the British position
marked a departure from the strict letter of the traditional law.
66 It is difficult to see the relevance of this reply to the charge of partiality, since instead of
attempting to deal with this charge it makes the quite different point that the application of
the doctrine of continuous voyage to blockade is justified. It was not disputed, however, that
trade between Scandinavian and German ports was not being intercepted. Yet the order of
March rr, 1915 purportedly applied to all neutral trade with all German ports. In this connection, Stone (op. cit., pp. 502.-3) declares-following a number of other writers-that the objection to the alleged partiality of the blockade was hardly critical, since "a blockade need not
cover every approach to the blockaded port's coast. The fact that intra-Baltic traffic was
beyond British reach seems to put the matter on no different basis; it was an objection to eco-

309

Finally, it was claimed that as measured by actual results the "blockade"
was extremely effective. 67
As judged by the accepted practice of states during the period prior to
World War I there was indeed little basis for contending that the "long
distance blockade" of Germany in World War I conformed to the essential
principles governing the traditional blockade. Nevertheless, it is a curious
fact that while allegedly novel circumstances have been generally considered as justifying far-reaching changes in the law of contraband, the circumstances that admittedly render a close blockade either impossible, or
largely futile even if possible, have still to be generally accepted as sanctioning similar changes in the law governing blockade. 68 Acceptance of the
principle of ultimate enemy destination with respect to contraband has
been accompanied by a pronounced reluctance to apply the same principle
to blockade. Yet if in the case of contraband neutral territory is no longer
nomic rather than naval effectiveness." But a blockade--at least according to the customary
rules-must cover all the sea approaches to the ports or coasts declared under hlockade. This the British

"long-distance blockade" did not-and could not-do.
It should also be noted that the "impartiality" of the British "blockade" was open to
question by reason of the large volume of British exports to Scandanavian and Netherlands
ports. Although the United States did not press this point it did attach some significance to
the fact that: "Great Britain exports and re-exports large quantities of merchandise to Norway,
Sweden, Denmark, and Holland, whose ports, so far as American commerce is concerned, she .1
regards as blockaded." Great Britain replied, in part, by pointing out that the volume of
American exports to Northern Europe nevertheless showed a greater rate of increase than did
British exports, and that American traders had made profits equal to or greater than the profits
of British traders. This response was quite irrelevant from a legal point of view, since the
traditional rules governing blockade required the blockading state to apply the blockade to
its own trade as well as to the trade of neutrals. Of course, Great Britain could contend, and
did contend, that British exports to neutral ports within the "blockaded" area were destined
solely for neutral consumption, though there was at the time substantial question as to the
validity of this contention. But even if true it did not do away with the charge that Great
B~.itain was using the "blockade" in order to advance her commercial interests.
67 With respect to the sea approaches in the North Atlantic, through which lines of controt
,
could be drawn, this was true enough. A different conclusion must be reached with respect to
intra-Baltic traffic. Trade between Germany and the Scandinavian countries did of course
decline as the war progressed. But this was due largely to Allied rationing policies imposed
upon neutral states, which form little or no relation to the issues at controversy.
68 Nor is it altogether relevant to argue that whereas by 1914 ample precedent existed for
applying the principle of ultimate destination to contraband carriage there was very little--if
any-authority for its application to blockade. Indeed, this contrast is itself misleading, since
the application of this principle to contraband clearly hung by a very slender reed up to 1914.
Despite the decisions of American prize courts during the Civil War, opposition to acceptance
of the principle of ultimate enemy destination in any form remained very strong. And quite
apart f~om this hostility, it will hardly be argued that these earlier decisions sanctioned the'
remarkable application given the principle after 1914, in building up what amounted to a new
law of contraband. Besides, if belligerent practice during the middle of the nineteenth century
could introduce precedents of a far-reaching character why was the same attribute denied to '
belligerent practice a half century later? There is, in fact, no apparent reason for admitting legal
change--in order to meet changed conditions--in the one case (contraband) and denying it
in the other (blockade).
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to be regarded as a safe emporium for goods 'vhose ultimate destination is
to an enemy it is difficult to understand the continued insistence upon just
this point in the case of blockade. 69 The exercise of contraband controls,
labelled as such, can surely prove quite as effective in barring access to
neutral ports as a blockade in which the principle of ultimate enemy destination is considered applicable to the offense of blockade breach. Still further, the distinction between goods consigned to a neutral port, and h aving
a genuinely neutral destination, and goods whose ultimate destination is
to an enemy is just as possible (or perhaps more accurately: no more difficult) to make in the case of blockade as in the case of contraband. 70
It is true that given the abandonment in recent hostilities of the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband, and the gradual dis69 One of the best arguments to this effect remains J. W. Garner's International Law and the
World War (192.o), Vol. II, pp. 32.7 ff. Also H. W. Malkin, "Blockade in Modern Conditions,"
B. Y. I. L., (!92.2.-2.3), pp. 87-98. And Hyde (op. cit., p. 2.199) writes that: "If the doctrine
of continuous voyage may be fairly applied to a neutral ship ostensibly bound for a neutral port
solely because of the fact that the vessel is ultimately bound for a blockaded enemy port,
does it follow that non-contraband neutral cargoes may be likewise seized when bound for
neutral ports, if further transportation by land or sea to the territory of the belligerent whose
coast is blockaded is in reality sought to be effected? It is believed to be difficult to find a
convincing negative answer, although it may be maintained with assurance that maritime
states had not yielded so broad a right when World War I was initiated.' '-A limited concession
to the application of the principle of ultimate enemy destination to blockade may be found in
the position (which now en joys a certain support from states, see p. 3 I6) that the doctrine
of continuous voyage may apply to blockade where both laps of the voyage are by sea and the
goods (though not necessarily the vessel) are intended to reach the blockaded area by way of
the forbidden route. But on this view goods intended, after reaching a neutral port, to be
forwarded to the blockaded area by a route (land or inland waterway) that does not involve
crossing the "lines of blockade" are exempt from seizure for blockade breach. The difficulty
with this view is that while it does not follow the customary law, which fastened attention
upon the final destination of the vessel and not of the goods, it fails to resolve the problem of
destination given the conditions under which blockade normally must now be conducted.
For it would fail to apply to goods destined to or originating from a blockaded area other than
by way of the forbidden route. This in itself could render a blockade largely futile in modern
conditions. Furthermore, in the case of blockades maintained at great distances from an enemy's
coasts the blockade runner-in a sense-passes through the "lines" of the blockading forces
on his way to a neutral port. Once in the neutral port the vessel might then sail for an enemy
port without-in a strict sense-again passing through the forbidden area. These considerations suggest the difficulties involved in attempting to apply the traditional law in modern
conditions. They also imply that a partial modification of the customary law governing
destination in the case of blockade may prove to be no solution at all.
70 Undoubtedly it is this consideration that has been a primary factor in the opposition to
applying, in the case of blockade, the principle of ultimate enemy destination to cargoes as
well as to vessels. In brief, the argument has been that once the destination of the ship is
no longer conclusive in determining the destination of the cargo-as it is under the traditional
rules governing breach of blockade-the way is opened to mere opinion and conjecture. In
this process, it is contended, goods with a genuine neutral destination are seized and belligerents are left free to interfere with innocent neutral traffic. At the same time, it will hardly
be denied that the conjecture that would admittedly accompany this application of the principle of ultimate enemy destination to blockade breach already characterizes the procedure
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appearance of the category of free goods, the practical difference benveen
contraband and blockade controls cannot be very great so far as enemy
imports are concerned. 71 One important difference must necessarily remain, ,
however, since seizure for carriage of contraband can apply only to goods
having an enemy destination, whereas seizure for blockade breach may
apply equally to exports from the blockaded area. Even so, the application
of what has been termed the principle of ultimate enemy origin appears no
less justified in the case of blockade than does the principle of ultimate
enemy destination when applied to the carriage of contraband. 72
In any event, World War II witnessed a repetition-though not without
certain significant modifications-of the "blockade" measures adopted in
the preceding conflict, and once again the legal basis fat these measures was
asserted to be the right of retaliation against the enemy's misconduct.
Thus in response to what were alleged to be illegal German acts of sub- ·
marine and mine warfare, an Order in Council of November 2.7, 1939 provided that any vessel sailing from a German port, or a port in territory
under enemy occupation, after December 4, 1939 might be intercepted and
required to discharge in a British or Allied port that part of its cargo as
was laden in an enemy port. Vessels sailing from non-enemy ports and
found to be carrying goods of enemy origin or ownership might also be
required to discharge such goods in a British or Allied port. The disposition to be made of goods so discharged and placed in the custody of the
marshal of the prize court varied, but-in principle-these goods could
either be requisitioned by the government or sold under direction of the
prize court with proceeds of Lhe sale to be paid to the owners after the
conclusion of peace under circumstances the court considered just. 73
for determining destination in the case of contraband carriage. The unfortunate truth is that
such conjecture is an inevitable result of the acceptance of the principle of ultimate enemy
destination in any form. To say this, however, is not to justify the belligerent attempt to
attach a legal liability to seizure of vessels and cargoes that have failed to obtain belligerent
clearance prior to departure from neutral ports-a matter to be dealt with shortly.
71 Assuming, of course, that the principle ot ultimate enemy destination is applicable to both.
72 And experience indicates that there is less uncertainty-and less conjecture-involved in
the attempt to determine the enemy origin of goods than in determining enemy destination.
73 The text of the November 2.7th Order in Council, with later changes, is given in Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. I 38-40. (A French decree of November 2.8th substantially followed
the British Order). A detailed account of the events leading up to the November 2.7th Order,
as well as its operation, is given by Medlicott, op. cit., pp. n2.-2.4. Considerable n~utral protest
was raised against the measure, and numerous modifications were made to its operation. The
measure was administered mainly by use of "certificates of origin and interest." These certificates, as Medlicott points out, ''were issued in the form of a statement by the consular officer'
at the port of loading that he was satisfied that the merchandise in question had nor been
produced in enemy territory, and that no enemy person or firm, or firm on the Statutory list,
had any interest in it. Separate certificates were required for each consignment, exc;ept in
certain exceptional circumstances . . . . " Vessels outward bound from adjacent neutral ports
were allowed to proceed if carrying cargoes covered by export passes. Vessels carrying cargoes
not so covered were diverted to a contraband control base where a period of detention followed and inquiry was made into the origin and ownership of the goods.
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The Order of November 2.7th served only as a prelude, however, to the
later Order in Council of July 3 I, 1940. The relevant provisions of this
. later retaliatory Order read as follows:
2.. Any vessel on her way to or from a port through which goods
might reach or come from enemy territory or the enemy armed
forces, not being provided with a Ship Navicert valid for the voyage on which she is engaged, shall, until the contrary is established, be deemed to be carrying contraband or goods of enemy
origin or ownership, and shall be liable to seizure as Prize; provided that a vessel, other than a vessel which sailed from or has
called at an enemy port, shall not be liable to seizure under the
provisions of this Article unless she sailed from or could have
called at a port at which she would, if duly qualified, have obtained a Ship Navicert.
3. (I) Goods consigned to any port or place from which they
might reach enemy territory or the enemy armed forces, and not
covered by a valid Cargo Navicert or, in the case of goods shipped
from a British or Allied port, by a valid Export or Transshiptnent
Licence, where such Licence is required, shall, until the contrary is
established, be deemed to have an enemy destination.
(2.) Goods shipped from any port from which goods of
enemy origin or ownership might have been shipped, and not
covered by a valid Certificate of Origin and Interest, shall, until
the contrary is established, be deemed to be of enemy origin or
ownership.
4· Goods of enemy origin or ownership shall be liable to condemnation.
5. Any vessel seized under Article 2. hereof and carrying contraband or goods of enemy origin or ownership shall be liable to
condemnation in respect of such carriage. 74
74

Statutory Rules and Orders, 1940, No. 1436. In the Preamble to the Order it was declared
that .. for the convenience of traders and for the avoidance of risks and delays inseparable from
the diversion of ships into port in the exercise of belligerent rights against commerce at sea, a
system has been instituted whereby passes can be obtained for approved cargoes and for ships
which carry none but approved cargoes.'' Paragraph I of the Order contained the following
definitions:
.. the term 'Cargo Navicert' means a pass issuable by the appropriate British or Allied
authority in the neutral country of shipment in respect of goods consigned to any port or
place from which they might reach the enemy, to the effect that, so far as is known at the
date of issue, there is no objection to the consignment . . .
"the term 'Certificate of Origin and Interest' means a pass issuable by the appropriate British
or Allied authority in the neutral country
"The term 'Ship Navicert' means a pass issuable to a vesselinrespectofa given voyage by
the appropriate British or Allied authority at all British, Allied or neutral ports, if that
authority is satisfied that the vessel is duly qualified to receive it."
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The principle, and novel, feature of the system of control thus introduced 75 may be found in the consequences attending the failure on the part
of neutrals to obtain the belligerent's prior approval for voyages undertaken, and cargo shipped, to or from any port providing access to the
enemy. By the terms of the Order liability to seizure was-in any eventjustified when a vessel failed to carry a Ship Navicert or goods were not
fully covered by Cargo Navicerts or Certificates of Origin and Interest.
The presumptions held to arise as a result of such failure were sufficient-if
not clearly rebutted-to warrant condemnation either of vessel or of cargo
or of both. To these legal liabilities were added measures the exercise of
which demanded no legal justification but whose effect in inducing neutral
shipowners and traders to participate in the Allied control system was
nevertheless very considerable. Thus the refusal on the part of neutral
shipowners to undertake full compliance with Allied regulations entailed ,
the deprivation of access to all British controlled facilities, e. g., bunkers,
drydocking, repairing and insurance. 76
75 The background of the Order of July 31, 1940 deserves a few words. By July 1940, German
conquests in Europe had rendered almost unworkable the system of contraband and enemy
export controls heretofore exercised. Instead of patrolling only the supply routes leading to
and from the principal ports of once adjacent neutrals, measures were now required to maintain
close and direct control over practically the whole of the European coastline. To attempt this
task through the use of naval patrols-which would continue to intercept neutral vessels-was
evidently impossible in view of the coastline to be patrolled and the vessels of the Royal Navy
available. Medlicott (op. cit., pp. 416-7) has pointed out that even before the defeat of France
"a complete naval blockade of German Europe was impossible . . . The result . . . was that
a great extension of control at source. , .. became imperative. The naval blockade-the actual
interception of blockade runners by ships of the Royal Navy-had, in other words, to be supple·
mented and, as far as possible, replaced by export control in all overseas territories from which
these supplies could reach Europe." In brief, the former threat of interception and detention
had to be replaced by other deterrents which would prove even more effective.
76 A clear and detailed picture of the system of controls emerging from the Order of July 31,
1940 is given by Medlicott, op. cit., pp. 42.2.-62.. In principle, this system rested upon three•
devices: compulsory navicerting, "ships warrants," and the rationing of neutrals. The nature
of the first measure had already been indicated. "Ships warrants" were documents issued to
each vessel whose owner agreed to comply with British regulations. In the absence of this
document none of the British controlled facilities would be made available to the vessel. In
addition, if even one vessel attempted to evade these regulations by carrying unnavicerted
cargo all ships belonging to the same line might be denied a ship warrant. The rationing of
neutrals implied the fixing of import quotas to be allowed neutral states, which were supposedly
adequate for domestic consumption though not for re-export. The close interdependence of
these three devices is made clear by Medlicott in the following passage: ''The withholding of
access to British-controlled facilities throughout the world supplied . . . an effective means
of inducing neutral shipowners to compel traders to make the applications for navicerts which
constituted the so-called compulsory system. It is also true that die compulsory navicert system
was necessary to the success of the ship-warrant scheme. The scheme as a blockade weapon
could be of full value only where there was machinery for the approval of cargoes and voyages,
that is, where the navicert system was in operation. The success of the government's plans for
the general control of neutral shipping in the interests of the Allies likewise depended to a
considerable extent on the control of cargoes and the rationing of neutrals • • • as this would
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In design, therefore, as in actual effect, the Order of .July 31, 1940 imposed
an almost complete control over neutral commerce, and did so by methods
that bore little resemblance to the traditional law. Provided that neutrals
submitted to this system of control, it is true that the Order made possible
the avoidance of the risks and delays attendant upon the diversion of
vessels into ports. This fact may be of relevance in judging the legitimacy
of the Order as a measure of retaliation, but apart from retaliation the legal
relevance of these ''concessions·· to neutral convenience must be doubted.
Nonnally, a belligerent has no right to regulate neutral trade through the
device of subjecting this trade to a legaL liability to seizure merely for the
reason that the neutral trader has not obtained the belligerent's prior
approval. 77 Nor may neutrals safely expect that an enemy will fail to
treat such compliance with one belligerent's regulations-even though
made'' compulsory''-as an act of unneutral service. 78

D. CONCLUSIONS
The difficulties that frequently have been noted elsewhere in this study
when attempting to evaluate the effect of recent belligerent practice upon
the traditional law appear even more pronounced in the case of blockade.
enable the Ministry of Shipping to forecast accurately the amount of shipping required for
the trade of a particular neutral. The rationing of the imports of adjacent neutrals was, in
turn, almost indispensable as a basis for the compulsory navicert arrangements," (pp. 431-2.).
It may be noted that up to this point not only had navicerts been ··voluntary" in characterinsofar as their absence was no cause for seizure-but that neutral rationing had been attempted
either by voluntary agreements (war trade agreements) with neutral states or by agreement
with neutral shipping lines.
77 In the case of the Order of July 31, 1940, the legal liability imposed was-as already noteda liability to seizure and to eventual condemnation if the presumptions thus held to arise were
not successfully rebutted. Sir G. G. Fitzmaurice (op. cit., p. 87) points out that the Order
""did not (and clearly could not), any more than was previously the case, compel shippers to
take out navicerts as a precondicion of effecting shipment. There was still no legal bar to
shipment without a navicert . . . The real changes effected by it were, it would seem, that
for the first time a legal liability to seizure was created, arising from the mere fact of the absence
of a navicert, coupled with a legal presumption (u~less and until rebutted) that unnavicerted
goods had an enemy destination." Buc it is difficult to see why Fitzmaurice insists that shippers
were not "'compelled" to take out navicerts or why he cavils against describing the Order as
establishing a ··compulsory" navicert system. Admittedly, condemnation did not follow
from the mere fact of the absence of a navicert, and in this particular sense the Order was not
compulsory. But it is only in this sense true. From the point of view of subjecting unnavicerted vessels and cargoes to seizure-with a legal presumption of enemy destination-it certainly was compulsory. Besides, as a measure of reprisal the very purpose of the Order was,
as Fitzmaurice himself points out, ·"to enlarge the normal legal powers of the Crown in the
matter of effecting seizures and obtaining condemnations, for otherwise there would have been
no point in it."-Gn the other hand, the opinion of S. W. D. Rowson,("'PrizeLawDuringthe
Second World War," pp. 196-7), that the Order merely contains rules of a "procedural character"
which are within the scope of a belligerent's normal legal powers, hardly seems acceptable.
78 See pp. 32.2.-3 for a brief comment on the navicert system-both in its voluntary and compulsory forms-in relation to unneutral service.
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Undoubtedly, the principal reason for this added difficulty may be attributed
to the almost uniform insistence of belligerents in justifying as reprisals
measures designed to accomplish the purpose of blockade-as presently ·
conceived-though without conforming to the traditional rules governing
this belligerent measure. 79 In consequence, there is room for asserting
that from the standpoint of a formal legal analysis it is unnecessary to go
beyond an examination of the legitimacy of the measures reviewed in
preceding pages, as measures of reprisal.,· that whatever judgment is made
concerning the legitimacy of these measures, as measures of reprisal, it
cannot affect the continued validity of the law governing blockade. If
this position is adopted it would appear that the traditional law remainson the whole-unchanged, with perhaps the one exception that breach of
blockade may now be considered as extending to instances where either
vessel or cargo is destined ultimately to a blockaded port (though immediately bound for a neutral port at the time of visit) by a route that requires
passing through the blockaded area. 80
At the satne time, acceptance of this view entails at least the admission
that in the circumstances characterizing recent naval hostilities the traditional blockade, and therefore a number of the rules governing its operation, have become largely irrelevant. H, however, recent belligerent practice is looked upon as a thinly veiled endeavor to replace the traditional
law through the instrument of reprisals, and this would seem to represent
the more realistic view, then the question of legal change must be squarely
faced. It has already been pointed out that if the principle of ultimate
79 In this connection note may be taken of the fact that, in contrast to World VI ar I, there was
no repeated attempt made by Great Britain in 1939 and 1940 to provide further justification for
the reprisal measures taken against Germany by contending that the latter conformed, in
substance at least if not in form, to the rules laid down for the traditional blockade. It would
appear that one of the major reasons for this silence was the absence of firm protest against the ,
British reprisal measures on the part of the United States.
so See Law of Naval Warfare, Article 632.g (3). It will be apparent that the formulation
presented above does not imply an unqualified application to blockade of the principle of ultimate enemy destination. On the contrary, it is only when vessel or cargo are destined to reach
a blockaded port by way of the forbidden route that breach of blockade may arise. It would
not apply, however, to goods ultimately destined to enemy territory under blockade if the
goods are to reach their destination by a route that would not involve crossing the "lines of
blockade." The difficulties that could easily arise in applying this qualified extension of the
principle of ultimate enemy destination to blockade have already been noted (seep. 3u (n)).
Nevertheless, it is not altogether clear that states have accepted even this limited change.
Despite the assertion of Colombos (op. cit., p. 2.56) and Stone (op. cit., p. 498), that applica- '
tion of continuous voyage to blockade may now be considered- an established principle of
international law, there remains some question as to the general acceptance of this limited
application of the principle with respect to cargoes, since the official position of a majority of
naval powers has stopped short of a clear and unequivocal endorsement. Nor is it likely .that
there will be any :Htempt toward clarification, in view of recent developments in the law of
contraband and the ready use that may be made of the instrument of reprisals in order to render
enemy exports liable to seizure.
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enemy destination is applicable to contraband there is no apparent reason
for continuing to deny its unqualified application to blockade. On this
basis, the further admission of the principle of ultimate enemy origin to
blockade would appear as a necessary corollary. 81 Nevertheless, it would
still remain necessary to insist that there is no warrant for asserting that
other criteria used in determining the lawfulness of blockade measures have
lost their validity. Blockades, in order to be binding, would still have to
be effectively maintained, and the element of danger associated with an
effective blockade would still have to be understood in terms of a liability
to seizure-not to destruction upon entrance into the forbidden area. 82
81 The substance of this change, if endorsed, would involve the acceptance of the British
reprisal measures of March 1915 and November 1939 (though not the measures of February 1917
and August 1940)-at least to the extent these measures implied the desirability of extending
the principles of ultimate enemy destination and origin to blockades which are otherwise
conducted in conformity with the traditional rules.
82 Thus a belligerent could not argue that the· necessity for patrolling vast areas of the high
seas thereby excused him from meeting the traditional requirement of effectiveness. Nor could
a belligerent-apart from reprisal-impose upon neutral vessels a liability to seizure andpossibly-to condemnation, unless neutral traders submitted to a system of control which
thereby permitted the belligerent to ease his burden of assigning large surface forces to the task
of intercepting blockade runners. The British reprisal Order of July 31, 1940 would still have
to find its justification as a reprisal. Certainly, when judged by the traditional law it could
have no other justification than as a reprisal.
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